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Abstract: Research within the European project of analyzing crisis 
management in European countries aimed, among other things, to question 
the qualitative dimension of new emergency management system in Serbia. In 
accordance with a particulary developed methodological framework, quality of 
this system was assessed in terms of its efﬁciency, effectiveness and legitimacy, 
based on the data gathered conducting interviewes with key decision makers and 
secondary source analysis. The fact that the system has been in existence for only 
two and a half years and that it still does not work at full capacity, since it has 
not been completed in a normative and institutional sense, makes any attempt 
of serious analysis and its evaluation difﬁcult and problematic. Nevertheless, 
some general remarks can be made. The system has been tested practically in the 
events of several natural disasters and one technological disaster. The general 
assessment is that, given the fact that it is not fully completed, it functioned 
relatively well. Recurrence of similar technological accidents like ﬁres in night 
clubs, indicates the inability of the system to properly determine liability, draw 
lessons and translate them into standard operating policies and procedures. 
Procedures for determining the professional and legal accountability are 
complicated and take a long time so the sanctions are not effective, while due to 
the overall constellation of political relations political accountability is minor. 
Key words: crisis management, Serbia, efﬁciency, effectiveness, 
legitimacy
Introduction
After almost two decades of rather unregulated responsibilities of 
particular ministries and bodies and outdated legislation, and lack of political 
will to regulate this area, the current Serbian civil security system1 has been 
* The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework 
Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement n°28467.
1 In this paper we will use terms civil security system, crisis management and emergency management as 
synonymous.
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established only in December 2009 when the Law on Emergency Situations 
(LES) was adopted in Parliament. This law is the basis for guiding all crisis 
management activities in the country. The Sector for Emergency Management 
(SEM) is recognized as a single body within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
where all emergency services from MOI, Ministry of Defence (MOD) and 
Ministry of Environment are integrated (Bojičić, 2013:170,171). Therefore, 
the crisis management approach is primarily based on civilian operations and 
bodies, while military capabilities are only being employed upon request of the 
SEM, when other resources are not sufﬁcient. Based on this law, Serbia takes 
mainly an all hazards approach with elements of a speciﬁc threats approach . 
The general intention was to design a comprehensive decentralised 
system around the Sector of Emergency Management of the Ministry of 
Interior as the main pillar and integrator of different actors and to link 
professional agencies and political representatives on all levels of government 
in emergency management headquarters with precise delineation of mandate 
and responsibilities. A crisis is prepared for and resolved where it happens, that 
is primarily at the local level. If it exceeds the capacity of the local community, 
up scaling occurs on the higher levels of government up to the national level in 
cases of large scale disasters, including the engagement of the police and army 
if necessary.
Crisis2 is deﬁned in Article 7 of the Law on Emergency Situations 
(LES) as “a situation when risks and threats or consequences of catastrophes, 
emergencies and other threats to population, environment and material goods, 
are of such scale and intensity that their occurrence or consequences cannot 
be prevented or eliminated through regular activity of competent agencies and 
services, and for the mitigation or elimination of which special measures, forces 
and means at higher operational regime are required.”3 (Law on Emergency 
Situations, a.7, Ofﬁcial Gazette RS, 111/10).
This paper presents the ﬁndings on qualitative assessment of the new 
crisis management system in Serbia that are result of the research project 
Analysis of civil security systems4 in Europe (ANVIL) done within European 
Commission FP7 Framework. The overall aim of ANVIL project is based on 
understanding that civil security (or crisis management) systems in Europe 
display a wide variation in structures, policies, rules and practices: countries 
have differently their efforts to protect citizens from a variety of threats and 
ensure their security and safety. Each system evolved in a unique historical and 
2  Generic legal term is emergency situation. Besides this more speciﬁc terms are natural hazard, technical 
and technological hazard - accident, disaster and emergency also used and explained in LES.
3  The English version of LES. Translated by MOI.
4  Civil security systems are deﬁned broadly as the national apparatus (policies, bodies, and mechanisms) 
designed to protect against new and urgent threats to the security of people and/or the functioning of 
critical infrastructures.
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cultural context. Each is bound by different legal/constitutional frameworks. 
Each system consists of different actors and is governed differently. Each 
system has different relations with private sector parties. And each system 
relates to its citizens in unique ways. This project draws together existing data 
and collects additional information where necessary to map the variety and 
similarities in Europe’s regional civil security structures, practices and cultures. 
It investigates if, and to what extent, variety affects the safety of Europe’s 
citizens (for better or worse). In doing so, our results give policy stakeholders 
a clear view of which kind of systems could successfully enhance the security 
in certain regions. Finally, by including policy stakeholders in all phases of the 
analysis process, the project contributes to and gives EU-added value to the 
debate concerning “not one security ﬁts all”. (ANVIL, 2012)  
Methodology - Quality measures
Within the ANVIL Mapping protocol a crucial question is how we 
can measure the quality of crisis management system is  deﬁned in terms 
of effectiveness, efﬁciency and legitimacy.5 The ANVIL Project takes an 
inductive approach towards the understanding of quality. Therefore, civil 
security systems will be gauged as effective, efﬁcient and legitimate as far 
as politicians, professionals and citizens in the countries studied deem them 
as such. Data are collected using secondary data sources and interviews with 
relevant stakeholders. 
Effectiveness is understood as the extent to which civil security systems 
are capable of producing reasonable results. In that sense main descriptive data 
refers to professional and political inquiries that have been carried out in the 
aftermath of major crises and limits to national capacities (calls for interna-
tional assistance and declaration of State of Emergency)
Efﬁciency is understood in terms of value-for-money or cost-beneﬁt 
analysis, i.e. the extent to which there is a reasonable balance between capacities 
at hand and their costs. In a comparative context, efﬁciency is ideally measured 
in terms of expenditures. However, emergnecy management sector costs are 
often highly fragmented, being allocated to a variety of functional areas (i.e. 
transportation, health care, infrastructure, police/intelligence, environment 
etc.) across different administrative or geographical levels (local, regional, 
national) and to different actors (ministries, special agencies, NGOs, private 
5  In deﬁning quality, we should keep in mind that different systems can be equally effective. What risks 
a nation should prepare for differ per country or region. In recent years, we have seen forest ﬁres in 
Southern Europe, massive earthquakes in Italy, ﬂooding in Eastern Europe, terrorist attacks in the UK, 
Spain and Norway, and infrastructure failures in Scandinavia (to name but a few recent events). In 
response to different crises, and shaped by different administrative traditions, risk cultures and legal 
constraints, different systems have evolved.
8 БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/1013
Managing emergency situations in Republic of Serbia - Qualitative Aspect
companies etc). In this context, the ANVIL Project gather budget/expenditure 
data, fully aware that their use for comparative purposes must be treated with 
care. Moreover, in an attempt to analyze efﬁciency, the Project  looks into the 
issue of efﬁciency in terms of the degree to which the countries have initiated 
reform plans from a cost-saving perspective. 
Legitimacy  of crisis management system is understood in context of 
political support (major criticism on the system, or existing controversies re-
garding elements of the system, political reactions and major reforms), legal 
support  (Ombudsman cases - if any crisis preparation/response laws and/or 
actions has been brought in to the ombudsman; legal cases - if  crisis prepa-
ration/response laws and/or actions has been legally challenged in national 
courts; and human rights and civil liberties - to what extent are basic human 
rights and civil liberties built into the civil security system) and popular/public 
trust and support (public perception and voluntary engagement). 
Findings
We will brieﬂy present the key ﬁndings about the quality of Serbian 
system of crisis management understood in three dimensions: effectiveness, 
efﬁciency and legitimacy.
Effectiveness - Assessment through professional
and political inquiries
Political inquiries
In the period of 2000-2012 there was only one major political inquiry 
in the aftermath of the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić. Besides the 
police and court investigation, a special Commission (“Korać`s Commission”) 
was formed with the task of examining the system of protection of the 
prime minister. The Commission found a number of failures in the work of 
the judiciary and serious lapses in personnel, organizational and technical 
aspects in the system of providing security of the Prime Minister and Serbian 
Government building.6 Only four lower level professionals in the police and 
security agencies were on call of duty. Court process against 44 persons charged 
with the assassination lasted for four years and they were sentenced to a total 
of 378 years. Investigation of the political background of the assassination is 
still going on.
6  Political background of assassination was not within the mandate of the Commission. The Commission 
for examining of system of protection of Prime Minister of Serbian Government Zoran Djidjic, PhD 
(2003).
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Hardly any lessons were learned from this signature crisis.7 Some 
improvements have been made in technical equipment for protection and 
selection, recruitment and training of the staff responsible for the security of 
high state ofﬁcials. However, the system is not very clear and precise so the 
president and/or prime minister are free to choose which civil or military agency 
will be responsible for their personal protection, on the basis of subjective 
assessment and their own trust in certain institution or individuals (Interview 
with a key respondent from the Commission).
Professional inquiries
In the aftermath of a national crisis, professional inquiries and reports 
are being made and discussed within Ministry of Interior/Sector for Emergency 
Management or National Emergency Management Headquarters, and later on 
submitted to the local/provincial/national government. Usually they are not 
followed by any public or parliamentary debate. Analyses are partial, from 
a viewpoint of a particular agency, and with no comprehensive synthetic 
reports. They are usually not publically available, remaining within particular 
ministries or narrow circles of the professional public. Lessons learned are 
not easily transferred into rules, procedures and practice. (Interview key re-
spondent from MOI). In general, crisis actors are in a certain way protected 
from responsibility in the Serbian political context with the fragile coalition 
governments.
If a crisis situation occurs in military facilities, the investigation is 
conducted by the Serbian Army and usually results are not available for the 
non-military actors. They sometimes might be long-lasting and inefﬁcient. 
(The Blic daily, 2012).
In some crisis situations on the local level there have been professional 
debates and judiciary processes. Illustrative is the case of ﬁre in the Contrast 
disco club in Novi Sad, in April of 2012 that killed six young people. This event 
triggered a series of public controversies since the facility was inadequate for 
the purpose and overcrowded. After eight months of prosecutorial investigation, 
the responsibility of authorities was not addressed, there were no tangible 
results and it was not determined who was to blame. At the same time bars that 
have been closed in a campaign manner are working again, the clubs are still 
burning torches, to make “ﬁre” cocktails and everything is more or less the same 
as before that tragic event. Additional exits have not been made, the clubs are 
still overcrowded and it is questionable whether they have got ﬁre equipment. 
7  Within ANVIL project a “signature crisis” is deﬁned as a major crisis that is kept as a central feature of 
the collective memory of the state’s citizens. Typical examples of signature crises are the Utoeya/Norway 
bombings of 2011, the 1994 Estonia ferry accident, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.
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Reporters got no answers on these questions from the SEM. The father of one 
of the dead girls launched an initiative to amend the three laws concerning the 
registration of nightclubs and restaurants, as well as the adoption of the Rules 
of ﬁre protection for this kind of facility (“Tamara`s Act”) to put an end to 
the bad practice of registering the night clubs before they meet ﬁre protection 
measures. He said that nothing concrete has been done and that he will continue 
to struggle because they do not want any more afﬂicted families. The public 
prosecutor has launched an investigation against the owner, two tenants and 
an electrician, and at the request of defence counsel, the trial was postponed 
before it started. Parents of the victims believe that the responsibility should be 
looked for also in the relevant inspections - construction and tourism, and the 
Sector for Emergency Management for inadequate inspection and intervention. 
(Stepanov, 2012).
Limits to national capacities
Serbia formally requested assistance from the Russian Federation in 
2007 in case of forest ﬁre. Ever since, each summer Russian special airplanes 
and crews arrive at the Centre for the emergency situations in Niš as a 
preventive system back-up support in accordance with the bilateral agreement. 
This assistance is humanitarian in nature and free of charge. The main reason 
for such assistance is insufﬁcient capacities, as Serbia does not have this kind 
of equipment. (Interview key respondent form MOI) 
A State of Emergency was declared one time in the period of 2000-
2012, in 2003 after the assassination of the Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić 
that destabilized the government. As Serbian legislation was too liberal (in 
terms of police powers, duration of detention etc), the state of emergency was 
introduced in order to make necessary constitutional changes and amendments 
to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Prosecutions that would enable 
the police to effectively prosecute the offenders. The government mounted 
Operation Saber (“Sablja”), the police action aimed at ﬁnding the assassins 
and striking a serious blow to organized crime. However, a number of political 
opponents to the Democratic Party and its government were arrested during 
this action in connection with organized criminal groups. Most were later freed. 
At the end of the operation, most of the suspects for the assassination were 
arrested (Vasić, 2005). The state of emergency lasted for 40 days (12.3. – 22.4. 
2003) and was revoked by the Government after the adoption of necessary 
legal changes.
Introducing the state of emergency was the signal that the whole criminal 
justice system was not able to combat organized crime and it signiﬁcantly 
contributed to improving the legislation and reform of the security sector. 
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The Emergency situation on national level was declared only once in 
February 2012 due to extreme weather conditions. No signiﬁcant improvements 
in coping with extreme weather conditions have been made so far. In a similar 
situation in December 2012 the actions undertaken by responsible actors were 
not adequate and in a timely manner.8 Due to the collapse in the road transport 
network that was created in December 2012 by heavy snowfall, the prime 
minister criticized the minister in charge, while the representatives of Public 
Enterprise “Roads of Serbia” claimed they did their job responsibly and that 
the blame for the current situation is on unscrupulous drivers of heavy vehicles 
that are speeding and driving without adequate winter equipment and creating 
trafﬁc jams. They also criticized the “competent authorities” (not explicitly 
mentioning Ministry of Transport) for not having prohibited cargo trafﬁc on 
the most critical sections until crews could clear them up and the weather 
allows for cargo trafﬁc to proceed. It was not speciﬁed who the “competent 
authorities “were, nor explained how the cooperation between the Republic 
Hydro meteorological Service, Public Enterprise “Roads of Serbia”, Trafﬁc 
police and MOI was functioning in practice (Galović, 2012).
Efﬁciency
It is very hard to apply the concept of efﬁciency on the Serbian civil 
security system. Before the adoption of LES there was no particular budget for 
crisis management, and annual expenditures for this purpose, from the budget 
of MOI, were only around 50,000 euro, while costs of crisis situations were 
covered from budget reserves on an ad hoc basis. When the national budget 
is tight and there is extreme pressure for critical resources, expending funds 
or distribution of funds for contingency requirements is a difﬁcult choice, so 
providing the funding to respond to a disaster was for decades considered an 
ad-hoc requirement to be dealt with at the time of the emergency. Actually the 
only major investment in crisis management before adoption of the e LES was 
in 2007 when € 12.8 million from the National Investment Plan was spent on 
purchase of vehicles for ﬁreﬁghters (Interview key respondent in MOI).
LES designated the following funding sources for crisis management:
Budget (national/provincial/local)• 
Fund for emergency situations, and• 
Other sources speciﬁed in LES and other laws• 
It is not possible to present total expenditures for crisis management 
as there are no comprehensive data.The budget of the Republic of Serbia 
8  One of the reasons is that the Republic transferred the road maintenance responsibility to the municipalities, 
but failed to carry out the transfer of funds for this purpose. In addition, some municipalities have signed 
contracts for road maintenance with companies that have gone bankrupt.
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shall provide funds for the permanent budget reserve, which is used to 
ﬁnance expenditures for participation in eliminating the consequences of 
emergencies.9
The permanent Reserve is up to 0.5% of total revenues and income from 
the sale of non-ﬁnancial assets for the ﬁscal year. The Government decides on 
use of the permanent budget reserve, at the proposal of the Minister of Finance. 
Besides this, the municipality/province is required to determine its budget 
funds for maintenance of the system as well as provisions for elimination of 
consequences of emergencies.10 When the municipal/provincial fund is not 
sufﬁcient for elimination of consequences of emergencies, then, in accordance 
with the criteria established by a government decree, funds from Republican 
budget reserves are transferred.
The Newly established Fund for emergency situations is aimed at the 
construction and maintenance of the civil security system. In the beginning, 
the fund will be used for necessary building and equipping of the system in 
accordance with the planned priorities, while later on all the crisis management 
actors will apply with their projects for these funds. (Interview key respondent 
MOI). In 2011, the fund disposed of 5 million, in 2012 -10 million11, and €15 
million are planned for 2013.
Serbia is still considered a country of “nonconsolidated democracy” with 
a number of political and social tensions (Vujaćič, 2009), so the question of 
efﬁciency in disasters is more complicated. Questions of budget on each level 
of governance are very important. Resources set aside for this purpose were 
utterly insufﬁcient, so that the Serbian President after the ﬂood in Trgovište 
in 2010 said that “funding for emergencies must be provided in the budget.” 
Regardless of ofﬁcial statements, there is no money for this purpose and 
ﬁnancing is purely reactive, without investments in prevention and mitigation. 
(Radović & Jovanović, 2011). The efﬁcacy of the Serbian crisis management 
system will be possible to question only once its funding is stabilized and its 
most basic needs satisﬁed, having in mind that for a number of years not even 
minimum funds were invested in it.
Legitimacy and political support
The legacy of the authoritarian rule, sanctions and political crisis in 
1990‘s, as well as the lack of democratic and parliamentary traditions and 
the basic consensus among the parliamentary parties on key social goals 
and values  and how to solve the major problems of society have resulted in 
9  For this purpose around €14 million is planned in 2013.
10  In SEM there are no centralized data of the total amount of these funds.
11  Serbian budget for 2012 around €8.5 billion.
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slow progress in building a democratic and stable social institutions. Due to 
huge program differences among members of the ruling coalitions, there was 
no stable parliamentary majority and only one government since 2000 that 
lasted a full mandate which made  it difﬁcult to implement social reforms. The 
greatest responsibility lies on the leadership of political parties whose narrow 
party, group and personal interests and the struggle for political power and 
money, are „mirrored“ in the lives of all social institutions. So, instead of 
democracy, Serbia has a partocracy, a de facto unconstitutional dominance of 
political parties over constitutional and governmental agencies and institutions 
(Vućetić, 2008).
In such a political context it took almost two decades for political 
actors to understand the importance of crisis management and to reach a basic 
consensus on fundaments of the current civil security system. The adoption 
of LES was preceded by several expert discussions, while the enactment 
in the Parliament passed without major controversies. Nowadays there is a 
general political support of key players for building a new system (Interview 
key respondent MOI). However, political actors sometimes see the crisis as 
an opportunity for self-promotion and scoring political points, or denouncing 
political opponents.12 Political interests and assessments sometimes have 
an impact on the functioning local emergency management HQ more that 
professional reasons. (Interview City of Belgrade EMHQ) 13
Since the establishment of the new system of civil security there 
have been no major criticisms and no political consequences for political 
representatives that relate to crisis management. Just in one case, due to the 
inadequate reaction of local government in the town of Trgovište, during the 
ﬂoods in May 2010, the entire municipal leadership was forced to resign three 
months later (Veljković, 2010).14 However, the problem related to the decades 
of neglecting of systematic measures for ﬂood prevention. 
 In the period of 2010-2012 there were only eight parliamentarian 
questions related to emergency management. Most of them were about the 
12  After the earthquake in Kraljevo representatives of the city opposition accused the government of 
irregularities in the allocation of funds for the (re)construction and asked for a detailed report. The mayor 
said that, “since the special account was opened, daily reports on inﬂow and expenditure of funds are 
published on the City`s website and urged police and prosecutors to check all the charges, saying that 
those are irresponsible and baseless accusations in order to collect political points See: http://www.blic.
rs/Vesti/Drustvo/240950/Ukinuta-vanredna-situacija-posle-zemljotresa-u-Kraljevu
13  Sometimes, a commander of EMHQ on local level can be a member of one party, and the Minister of 
Interior, to whom the head of SEM is responsible, can be a member of another party. Those political 
parties can have different interests and perception when it comes to the managing of a particular crisis. 
In this kind of conﬂicts, usually the more powerful political party will determine the course of action.
14  The question of accountability for the crisis in the Serbian context is slightly peculiar, taking into account 
that after the disintegration of SFRY, followed by three wars and 500.000 refugees and IDPs, economic 
sanctions and isolation, the highest inﬂation in the history of mankind, the armed uprising on Kosovo and 
the NATO bombing, citizens of Serbia have somewhat grown accustomed to crises.
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compensation of damages from natural disasters and none of them was answered 
by the Minister of interior, but by the Prime Minister or other ministers) or 
the answer was postponed. (Parliament, 2011) Only one question was about 
addressing the responsibility for the damage caused by storm and hail and 
reorganization of hail protection service.
Legitimacy and legal support
There have been several complaints to the Serbian Ombudsman related to 
natural disasters. Despite the fact that the Law on Using Funds for Restoration 
and Protection from Natural Disasters is in force, people who are affected by 
natural disasters face many problems. As regards large-scale damages, for 
which the state and/or local self-government have allocated a certain amount 
of funds to help the affected citizens, the following problems occur: a lack of 
regulations setting the terms, procedures and criteria for determining the order 
for awarding the funds for restoration of damage (ranking); the absence of a 
body authorised to decide on objections/appeals ﬁled against the decisions of 
competent authorities;  the absence of a body authorised to control the use of 
funds allocated for the elimination of consequences of natural disasters.
The citizens who have suffered smaller scale damages face different 
problems. According to the views of the competent judicial and administrative 
authorities, they usually cannot expect the state to participate in restoring the 
damage caused by natural disasters.15 When they receive a decision from the 
relevant city or municipal inspection on the prohibition of using a damaged 
residential building, in practice they are often provided with temporary 
accommodation for a short period, and then the local self-government informs 
them that there are no funds in its budget earmarked for repairing the damage 
or constructing a new residential building, after which they are left on their 
own.
The situation in this ﬁeld is additionally complicated by the fact that the 
Government and the competent minister (MOI) were obliged to adopt more 
detailed regulations for the implementation of the said Law within six months 
of its entry into force, which, according to the available information, has not 
15  In the procedure of citizen complaints, the Ministry of Environment, Mining and Spatial Planning 
expressed its view that the mere fact of the damage caused by natural disasters and its assessment by 
the authorised commission did not produce an obligation of a public authority to compensate for and 
restore the damage, bearing in mind that the damage had been the result of circumstances that could 
not be predicted. This attitude was also articulated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia Rev. 
No.2241/2007 of 11 September 2008, stating that when the damage was caused by the so-called force 
majeure, the effects of which could not be predicted, the rule on exemption from liability was generally 
applicable. However, when the force majeure causes large scale damage affecting more people, then the 
state intervenes and commits itself and its institutions to secure all or part of the funds for eliminating the 
harmful consequences according to the principle of solidarity.
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been done (Protector of Citizens, 2011: 131-135).
LES provides equal protection for all citizens in crisis situations. 
In addition, National Strategy for Protection and Rescue in Emergencies 
(NSPRE) insists on paying special attention to the training of all agents of 
crisis management in order to provide appropriate assistance and protection 
of vulnerable social groups / children, elderly and persons with disabilities in 
natural and other disasters
Popular trust and support
In general, the level of trust in institutions in Serbia is low, as presented 
in the following table
Table 1: Trust in institutions (%), Source CeSID, 2011.
 
Do not 
know
No trust
Neither 
have 
nor 
have 
not
Have 
trust
Total
Church 4 19 18 59 100
Police/Police ofﬁcers 2 25 28 45 100
Army/Soldiers 7 21 28 44 100
MOI 2 26 30 42 100
Educational system 4 28 28 40 100
Health system 1 36 26 37 100
MOD 7 28 32 33 100
Local government 4 42 29 25 100
Serbian Government 3 47 30 20 100
Judiciary 4 52 26 18 100
Citizens associations 10 43 29 18 100
Parliament 3 53 28 16 100
Political Parties 4 66 21 9 100
There are no particular surveys on trust in institutions of civil security 
systems, but the presented data show that trust in the police, MOI and MOD, as 
important actors of crisis management, is higher than for all other institutions 
except the church.
There are no particular data on trust in SEM, and data for the MOI 
cannot be mechanically transferred to SEM. However, some conclusions can 
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be drawn indirectly. People in Serbia usually perceive institutions through their 
leaders. So the SEM is perceived through its Head, Mr. Predrag Marić who is 
often in the media, trying to raise awareness, explain problems and emphasize 
the importance of crisis preparedness and sharing responsibility in this area. 
For his work he got several local (person of the year in capital Belgrade) and 
international (French medal of knight) awards, so SEM efforts are recognized 
and appreciated by the community (Interview key respondent MOI).
Conclusion
After two decades of legal vacuum, organizational and institutional 
confusion resulting from the collapse of the civil security system adapted to the 
socialist society and the lack of elementary responsibility and vision of political 
leadership, Serbia in 2010 set up a normative/legal basis for the construction of 
a new civil security system.
When designing the new system and making the law, comparative 
experiences, historical background, capabilities and capacities of the country 
and its prospects of EU integration, as well as the current political constellation 
were taken into account. The professional community has positively assessed 
the legal text. Normative regulation of the system is almost completed, but 
the passage of national laws is not a sufﬁcient response. However it puts the 
government in a better position as having addressed the problem and laid 
the foundation for a national response capability. The implementation or 
enforcement phase is facing a number of problems such as insufﬁcient resources 
available and problems related to creation of other organizational, personnel 
and material and technical conditions for its successful implementation.
There is a growing recognition that disaster prevention and emergency 
response must be one of the government’s priorities. Although general 
political consensus on the importance of the civil security system has been 
achieved, there remains a reﬂection of existing political divisions and interests 
on professional performance, as well as an underlying political calculus in 
all phases of crisis management, when political actors are more preoccupied 
with their ratings, than with the wellbeing of the citizens. Relations between 
the state and civil society actors are not precisely deﬁned, and they are 
dependant on personal relations among people in institutions. Like in  most 
of the South Eastern Europe countries there is signiﬁcant room for national 
and multilateral initiatives to improve public awareness and involvement in 
disaster preparedness efforts (DPPI, 2001).
The fact that the system has been in existence for only two and a half 
years and it is still not working at full capacity, since it is not completed in a 
normative and institutional sense, makes any attempt of serious analysis and its 
17БЕЗБЕДНОСТ 2/1013
ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPERS
evaluation difﬁcult and problematic. Nevertheless, some general remarks can be 
made. In NSPRE it is stated that the current level of organization and capability 
of system of civil security in Serbia is signiﬁcantly behind the assessed needs 
and objective possibilities of the state. There is a need for technical innovation 
and equipping, as well as for improving and modernisation of infrastructure, of 
informational-communication systems in accordance with EU standards. The 
statistical data in Serbia show insufﬁcient capacity of the society to respond to 
the present challenges, risks and threats in an adequate way, which results in 
material and non-material damage, both at the level of commercial entities and 
at the state level (Keković, Marić,  and Komazec, 2011). Prevention seems to 
be the weakest point, together with the fact that in some parts of the Serbian 
population there are no traces of awareness and responsibility for safety. There 
are also problems related to the harmonization of different organizational 
cultures of staff co-opted in SEM and overcoming the divisions between “us“ 
and “them” (Interview key respondent MOI).16
The most important gaps outlined in NSPRE relate to institutional 
organization (lack of conditions for the consistent application of regulations, 
inadequate organization and implementation of preventive measures, lack of 
specialized cadastres, comprehensive risk maps, methodology for hazardous 
waste management, 112 system, uneven distribution of capacities of the 
emergency response services in the RS), material – technical (unsatisfactory 
level of road and other infrastructure, outdated, unreliable equipment, facilities 
and vehicles of the emergency response services, lack of specialized vehicles 
and equipment for responding to chemical accidents in road, rail and river 
transport etc.), cooperation, coordination and availability of information 
(insufﬁcient coordination between protection and rescue system entities in 
emergency situations, between scientiﬁc and research institutions and direct 
beneﬁciaries of researches, with NGOs and the private sector and international 
cooperation), human resources and capacity building (inadequate professional 
qualiﬁcation and technological discipline of the available human resources, 
lack of specialized personnel, insufﬁcient training, unpreparedness and a low 
level of the local self-government capacity and underdeveloped culture of 
prevention).
The system has been tested practically in several natural disasters (ﬂoods, 
extreme temperatures and earthquake) and in one technological disaster. The 
general assessment is that, given the fact that it is not fully completed, it 
functioned relatively well.17 The system proved relatively successful in a crisis 
situation caused by a snow storm in February 2012, but in a similar situation 
16  This refers to the employees of the MOD (an institution with military organizational culture) who were 
incorporated in the MOI.
17  It can be stated that it functioned signiﬁcantly better than in a similar situation before the introduction of 
the new system.
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in December 2012, reacted poorly. Recurrence of similar technological 
accidents (ﬁres in night clubs) indicates the inability of the system to properly 
determine liability, draw lessons and translate them into standard operating 
policies and procedures. Procedures for determining the professional and legal 
accountability are complicated and take a long time so the sanctions are not 
effective, while due to the overall constellation of political relations political 
accountability is minor. It seems that, due to the lack of ﬁnancing and political 
environment it is very hard to apply the concept of efﬁciency on the Serbian 
civil security system. It will be in the focus of decision makers only once its 
funding is stabilized and its most basic needs satisﬁed.
Development and completion of the system will depend on material 
and technical requirements, support of political actors and enthusiasm of 
the professionals in SEM and in other institutions responsible for crisis 
management.
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Управљање ванредним ситуацијама у Републици Србији 
– квалитативни аспект*18
Апстракт: Истраживање у оквиру европског пројекта испитивања 
кризног менаџмента у европским земљама је, поред осталог, имало за циљ да 
испита и квалитативну димензију новог система за управљање ванредним си-
туацијама у Републици Србији. У складу са посебно развијеним методолошким 
оквиром, квалитет система је испитиван кроз његову ефикасност, ефектив-
ност и легитимност, а на основу интервјуа са кључним доносиоцима одлука 
и анализе секундарних извора. Чињеница да нови систем постоји тек нешто 
више од две и по године и да још увек не функционише пуним капацитетом, 
будући да није сасвим комплетиран у нормативном и институционалном сми-
слу, чини сваки покушај његове озбиљне анализе тешким и проблематичним. 
Ипак, могуће је изнети нека општа запажања. Систем је практично тести-
ран у неколико природних и једној техничкој ванредној ситуацији и по општој 
оцени је функционисао релативно добро. Понављање сличних технолошких 
акцидената, као што су пожари у ноћним клубовима, показује неспособност 
система да на одговарајући начин адресира питање одговорности, да извуче 
поуке и преточи их у стандардне оперативне процедуре. Поступци утврђи-
вања професионалне и законске одговорности су спори и компликовани, тако 
да санкције нису ефективне, док је, услед укупне констелације политичких од-
носа, политичка одговорност актера минорна.
Кључне речи: кризни менаџмент, Србија, ефикасност, ефективност, 
легитимност
* Резултати објављени у раду су настали у оквиру истраживања финансираног од стране Седмог 
Оквирног  Програма Европске уније FP7/2007-2013, у оквиру Уговора о донацији број 28467. 
